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CASE NOTES

The Minnesota Supreme Court in Hepfel underscored the significance
of the interests of all parties to the paternity action in the accurate determination of paternity and noted that the best method to protect those
interests was adjudication in an adversary proceeding. 63 The complexity
and importance of the paternity action magnifies the necessity for courtappointed counsel. The court, in effect, declined only to label its holding
a constitutional right, in expectation that the pending Uniform Parentage Act would make a constitutional ruling unnecessary.

Torts--PARENTAL IMMUNITY FOR NEGLIGENT INSTRUCTION

DENIED-Romanik v. Toro Co., 277 N.W.2d 515 (Minn. 1979).
Around the turn of this century, American courts carved out a rule
immunizing parents from tort actions brought by their children.' Based
upon the need for harmony in the home2 and preservation of the family
In re Estate of Pakarinen, 287 Minn. 330, 334, 178 N.W.2d 714, 716 (1970), appeal dismissed, 402 U.S. 903 (1971).
63. See 279 N.W.2d at 348.
1. The genesis of the rule lies in a series of state court decisions sometimes referred to
as "the great trilogy." See Comment, Tort Actioms Between Members ofthe Family-Husband&
Wife-Parent & Chid, 26 Mo. L. REV. 152, 181-82 (1961). Mississippi became the first
state to recognize parent-child tort immunity. See Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So.
885 (1891). In Hewlett, the Mississippi Supreme Court adamantly refused to allow an
action between a parent and child for an intentional personal tort. Id. at 711, 9 So. at 887.
Although limited authority against the immunity existed in England, see Ash v. Ash, 90
Eng. Rep. 526 (1696) (daughter successfully sued her mother for assault, battery, and false
imprisonment), the Hewlett court neither cited any authority nor discussed any rationale
other than the "repose of families." See 68 Miss. at 711, 9 So. at 887. This rationale is of
tenuous application in Hewlett because the child directed the action against the estate of a
deceased parent. Id. at 707, 9 So. at 886. Hewlett was followed by McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903), in which the Tennessee Supreme Court denied a
minor plaintiff recovery against a parent for alleged cruel and inhuman treatment. Id. at
393, 77 S.W. at 665. Although the cruel treatment was inflicted by a stepmother, the
court held that the father was responsible and, therefore, the child was barred from bringing suit against the father. Id. at 391, 77 S.W. at 664. Then, in Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash.
242, 79 P. 788 (1905), the Washington Supreme Court felt that society's interest in protecting family harmony mandated immunity when the tort involved incestuous rape. Id. at
243, 79 P. at 788. Many courts, finding the parent-child immunity analogous to interspousal immunity, denied the child a cause of action. See, e.g., Downs v. Poulin, 216 A.2d
29, 32 (Me. 1966) (listing cases); Luster v. Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 482, 13 N.E.2d 438, 440
(1938), overruled in part, Sorensen v. Sorensen, 369 Mass. 350, 353, 339 N.E.2d 907, 909
(1975); McKelvey v. McKelvey, Ill Tenn. 388, 391, 77 S.W. 664, 665 (1903); Roller v.
Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 245, 79 P. 788, 789 (1905).
2. See, e.g., Baits v. Baits, 273 Minn. 419, 437-38, 142 N.W.2d 66, 78 (1966)
(Rogosheske, J., concurring specially); Reingold v. Reingold, 115 N.J.L. 532, 535, 181 A.
153, 154-55 (1935), overrmled, France v. A.P.A. Transp. Corp., 56 N.J. 500, 506-07, 267 A.2d
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exchequer, 3 the parent-child tort immunity rule precluded recovery by
children from their parents, or by parents from their children. 4 Minnesota adopted the rule in 1908, 5 later adding the justification that without
the rule a proliferation of litigation 6 and possible erosion of family harmony would result. 7 Because the rule had no support in English jurisprudence and little basis in American decisions, it eventually succumbed
to equitable attacks and became riddled with exceptions.8 In the last
490, 494 (1970); Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923). The Small court
stated:
There are some things that are worth more than money. One of these is the
peace of the fireside and the contentment of the home; for of such is the kingdom
of righteousness. While the family relation of parent and child exists, with its
reciprocal rights and obligations, the latter should not be taught "to bite the
hand that feeds it," and no such action as the present should be entertained by
the courts. . . . It is doubtful if any age promises a sweeter remembrance than
that of a happy childhood, spent in the lovelight of kindly smiles and in the
radiance of parental devotion. . . . If this restraining doctrine were not announced by any of the writers of the common law, because no such case was ever
brought before the courts of England, it was unmistakably and indelibly carved
upon the tablets of Mount Sinai.
Id. at 585-86, 118 S.E. at 16.
3. See Baits v. Baits, 273 Minn. 419, 430-31, 142 N.W.2d 66, 73 (1966).
4. See, e.g., id. at 429, 142 N.W.2d at 72; Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d 68, 70
(Mo. 1960) (reviewing and analyzing cases in support of the immunity rule); Badigian v.
Badigian, 9 N.Y.2d 472, 473-74, 174 N.E.2d 718, 719, 215 N.Y.S.2d 35, 36-37 (1961) (immunity based on fact that parents and children form a unique type of social unit distinguishable from all other groups), overruled, Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 438, 245
N.E.2d 192, 193, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529, 531 (1969).
5. Taubert v. Taubert, 103 Minn. 247, 249, 114 N.W. 763, 764 (1908) (unemancipated minor cannot sue parent for tort).
6. See Miller v. Pelzer, 159 Minn, 375, 378, 199 N.W. 97, 98 (1924).
7. See id. Other courts have advanced similar justifications. See, e.g., Schenk v.
Schenk, 100 Ill. App. 2d 199, 202, 241 N.E.2d 12, 13 (1968); Elias v. Collins, 237 Mich.
175, 177, 211 N.W. 88, 88 (1926) (peace of family and society), overruled, Plumley v. Klein,
388 Mich. 1, 8, 199 N.W.2d 169, 172 (1972). The immunity rule was also justified on the
ground that without such a rule a parent would be forced to take inconsistent positions in
that the parent, as plaintiff, would be seeking to divest the child of property subject to
parental protection. See Baits v. Baits, 273 Minn. 419, 431, 142 N.W.2d 66, 74 (1966).
Minnesota abandoned these reasons as make-weight and insufficient. See 1d. at 431-32, 142
N.W.2d at 74. See also Grilliot & Mishkind, Emancipation From the Famuly Immunity Doctrine,
15 AM. Bus. L.J. 305, 307-10 (1977); McCurdy, Torts Between Parent and Child, 5 VILL. L.
REV. 521, 528-29 (1960); McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HARv. L.
REV. 1030, 1072-77 (1930).
8. See Note, Intrafamilial Tort Immunity in New Jersey. Dismantling the Bam'er to Personal
Injur , Litigation, 10 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 661, 672 (1979). Notable exceptions or distinctions
include the employer-employee relationship, see, e.g., Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 364,
150 A. 905, 911 (1930) (minor child, injured while employed by father who carried liability insurance, could sue the parent for tort); Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 577, 103
N.E.2d 743, 748-49 (1952) (parent in business or vocational capacity not immune from
tort action by unemancipated minor child); Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 658, 261 P.2d
149, 157 (1952) (immunity rule inapplicable when injury to child arises out of parent's
operation of business); Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932) (parent, as opera-
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twenty years, courts have begun to view the immunity with disfavor9
because its operation could leave an injured child without a remedy and
possibly place the entire burden of liability upon a cotortfeasor.t0 In an
attempt to correct these inequities, a significant number of states have
abrogated the immunity rule in whole or in part.' Courts eliminating
tor of school bus, not immune from suit by minor child who was an injured passenger),
and willful or malicious torts. See, e.g., Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 430, 289 P.2d
218, 224 (1955) (unemancipated minor may sue parent for a willful or malicious tort);
Wright v. Wright, 85 Ga. App. 721, 726, 70 S.E.2d 152, 155 (1952) (no parental immunity
for willful or malicious act, provided the act is of such cruelty as to authorize forfeiture of
parental authority); Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 68, 77 A.2d 923, 926 (1951) (no parental immunity for atrocious acts committed by father in daughter's presence); Cowgill v.
Boock, 189 Or. 282, 301, 218 P.2d 445, 453 (1950). An unemancipated minor could sue a
parent, see Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 430, 289 P.2d 218, 224 (1955), and an unemancipated minor could sue the estate of a deceased parent. See, e.g., Davis v. Smith, 253
F.2d 286, 289-90 (3d Cir. 1958); Shumway v. Nelson, 259 Minn. 319, 324, 107 N.W.2d
531, 534 (1961); Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d 68, 73 (Mo. 1960). But see Hewlett
v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891) (suit against estate not allowed). A relatively
recent exception has arisen to allow suits after the termination of the family relation. See
Fugate v. Fugate, 582 S.W.2d 663, 669 (Mo. 1979) (action allowed against divorced, noncustodial parent), modziing Bahr v. Bahr, 478 S.W.2d 400 (Mo. 1972). The Fugate court
justified its departure from the general rule of immunity in Missouri because "immunity
from suit in tort deprives an injured party of a particular remedy and therefore should not
be extended beyond the point of that which is necessary to assist and support the functioning of an existing family unit." Fugate v. Fugate, 582 S.W.2d at 669.
9. See cases cited in note 11 Inifa.
10. See, e.g., Hebei v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8, 15 (Alaska 1967) (arguments in favor of
immunity do not outweigh necessity of affording child a remedy); Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal.
3d 914, 920, 479 P.2d 648, 651-52, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 291-92 (1971) (justice is not served by
denying person a remedy simply on the basis of possible collusion between parent and
child); Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431, 441, 161 N.W.2d 631, 637 (1968) (in balancing
arguments in favor of parental immunity with those favoring a remedy for the child, court
fbund the child's interests to have more weight); Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 436, 224
A.2d 588, 591 (1966) (arguments for parental immunity insufficient to deny remedy to
unemancipated minors as a class); Brief for Appellant at 13, Ascheman v. Village of Hancock, 254 N.W.2d 382 (Minn. 1977) (appellant argued that one result of the parental
immunity rule was that the cotortfeasor who was not immune was forced to pay the entire
award).
11. At least 21 states have abrogated the parent-child immunity, in whole or in part,
by judicial decision or statute. See, e.g., Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1967); Streenz
v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 471 P.2d 282 (1970); Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d
648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971); Trevarton v. Trevarton, 151 Colo. 418, 378 P.2d 640 (1963);
Petersen v. City & County of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 484, 462 P.2d 1007 (1969); Schenk v.
Schenk, 100 11. App. 2d 199, 241 N.E.2d 12 (1968); Sorensen v. Sorensen, 369 Mass. 350,
339 N.E.2d 907 (1975); Plumley v. Klein, 388 Mich. 1, 199 N.W.2d 169 (1972); Baits v.
Baits, 273 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66 (1966); Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 528 P.2d
1013 (1974); Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 500, 267 A.2d 490 (1970); Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23
N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.E.2d 192, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969); Nuelle v. Wells, 154 N.W.2d 364
(N.D. 1967); Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 351 (1971); Wood v. Wood, 135 Vt.
119, 370 A.2d 191 (1977); Smith v. Kauffman, 212 Va. 181, 183 S.E.2d 190 (1971); Lee v.
Comer, 224 S.E.2d 190 (W. Va. 1976); Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193
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the parental immunity rule have adopted four main approaches to abrogation: total abrogation,' 2 the reasonable parent standard,' 3 abrogation
except for activities associated with family relationships or objectives,14
and abrogation with specific exceptions.15 In 1966, the Minnesota
(1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572C (Cum. Supp. 1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1539.21 (Cum. Supp. 1977) (constitutionality upheld in Ledwell v. Berry, 39 N.C. App.
224, 249 S.E.2d 862 (1978), cert. denied, 296 N.C. 585, 254 S.E.2d 35 (1979)); S.C. CODE
§ 15-5-210 (1977).
12. See, e.g., Petersen v. City & County of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 484, 486, 462 P.2d
1007, 1008-09 (1970); Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 439, 245 N.E.2d 192, 194, 297
N.Y.S.2d 529, 532 (1969) (abolished defense of intrafamily immunity for nonwillful torts
when liability established). Although a court may not recognize the tort immunity, it can
protect the parent by refusing to find the particular conduct actionable in tort. See
Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 51, 324 N.E.2d 338, 346, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859, 871-72
(1974) (refusing to allow cause of action for negligent supervision).
13. See Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914,479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971). The
"reasonable parent" standard recognizes a parent's prerogative and duty to exercise authority over his child, but this prerogative must be exercised within reasonable limits.
"The standard to be applied is the traditional one of reasonableness, but viewed in light of
the parental role. . . . [W]hat would an ordinarily reasonable and prudent parent have
done in similar circumstances?" Id. at 921, 479 P.2d at 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 293 (emphasis in original). Commentators have heralded the "reasonable parent" approach because
it operates regardless of the nature of the parent's activity while eliminating "the abstruse
and often arbitrary distinction between immunity and liability that is inherent in other
alternatives." Note, supra note 8, at 679; see Comment, "The Reasonable Parent"Standard- An
Alternative to Parent-Child Tort Immunity, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 795, 809 (1976). See also
Comment, ParentalImmunity. Caliornia'sAnswer, 8 IDAHO L. REV. 179, 187 (1971) (reasonable parent approach advocated for Idaho); Note, The Parent-ChildTort Immunity Law in
Massachusetts, 12 NEw ENGLAND L. REv. 309, 331-32 (1976) (reasonable parent approach
advocated for Massachusetts); Comment, ParentalImmunity. The Casefor Abrogation of ParentalImmunity in Florida, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 794, 802 (1973) (reasonable prudent parent test
advocated for Florida); Comment, Parent-ChildTort Immunity: A Rule in Need of Change, 27
U. MIAMI L. REV. 191, 206-07 (1972) (same). Furthermore, the "reasonable parent" approach allows for a case-by-case analysis of claims without the possibility of a meritorious
claim being prevented by categories of exclusion. Compare Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d at
921-22, 479 P.2d at 652-53, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 292-93 with notes 18-19 infra and accompanying text.
14. Schenk v. Schenk, 100 I11.App. 2d 199, 206, 241 N.E.2d 12, 15 (1968). Immunity
is preserved "for conduct of either parent or child arising out of the family relationship
and directly connected with the family purposes and objectives." Id. No immunity was
conferred when a 17-year-old child negligently ran into her father with an automobile
while he was a pedestrian. Id. at 200, 241 N.E.2d at 12.
15. See, e.g., Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963). In concluding
that the child's action would be permitted, the Wisconsin court abrogated the immunity
but preserved two exceptions: "(1) Where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of
parental authority over the child; and (2) where the alleged negligent act involves an
exercise of ordinary parental discretion with respect to the provision of food, clothing,
housing, medical and dental services, and other care." Id. at 413, 122 N.W.2d at 198. The
first exception embraces parental discipline. See Thoreson v. Milwaukee & Suburban
Transp. Corp., 56 Wis. 2d 231, 246, 201 N.W.2d 745, 753 (1972). The major criticisms of
Coller are that it immunizes a parent from liability for obviously negligent or unreasonable conduct, see Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d at 921-22, 479 P.2d at 652-53, 92 Cal. Rptr.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol6/iss1/7

4

et al.: Torts—Parental Immunity for Negligent Instruction Denied—Romanik
CASE NOTES

Supreme Court permitted a parent to recover from his child,16 and, two
years later, completed abrogation of the rule by adopting the fourth approach, 17 thereby preserving two areas of parental immunity: injuries
caused by negligent actions involving the exercise of reasonable parental
authority;18 and injuries resulting from the use of "ordinary parental discretion with respect to the provision of food, clothing, housing, medical
and dental services, and other care."' 9
Although the two remaining circumstances in which courts may apply
the parental immunity doctrine do not expressly embrace acts of negligent parental supervision, many injuries to children occur because of
such negligence. In Romarnk v. Toro Co. ,20 the Minnesota Supreme Court
faced the question whether negligent supervision falls under the rules allowing application of the parental immunity doctrine.2 1 Romanik involved a thirteen-year-old plaintiff who injured his hand while operating
a Toro snowthrower.22 The plaintiff had been instructed by his father to I
depress the machine's auger clutch lever by hand instead of with his foot
as indicated in the owner's instruction manual.23 The snowthrower
pulled the plaintiff's hand into a partially exposed pulley and drive belt,
at 292-93 (1971); Comment, The 'Reasonable Parent" Standard- An Alternative to Parent-Child
Tort Immunity, supra note 13, at 806 n.54, and that it inevitably results in the drawing of
arbitrary distinctions as to when parental conduct falls within or without the immunity
guidelines. See Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d at 922, 479 P.2d at 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
The potential for arbitrary application is especially evident when construing the second
exception of legal duties. See Comment, supra at 807-08; cf Ourada v. Knahmuhs, 301
Minn. 131, 221 N.W.2d 659 (1974) (parental discretion in providing housing immunized
father's negligence in not maintaining stairway); Cherry v. Cherry, 295 Minn. 93, 203
N.W.2d 352 (1972) (discretion in housing includes use of extension cord); Thomas v. Kells,
53 Wis. 2d 141, 146-48, 191 N.W.2d 872, 874-75 (1971) (remanded for determination
whether stairway was part of father's "home").
16. Baits v. Baits, 273 Minn. 419, 433-34, 142 N.W.2d 66, 75 (1966).
17. See Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431, 161 N.W.2d 631 (1968).
18. Minnesota adopted the exceptions of Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 413, 122
N.W.2d 193, 198 (1963), but added the word "reasonable" to the first exception concerning the use of parental authority. See Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431, 442, 161 N.W.2d
631, 638 (1968). Thus, the immunity in Minnesota does not extend to all injuries caused
by parental performance of legal duties. See Comment, The "Reasonable Parent" Standard
An Alternative to Parent-ChildTort Immunity, supra note 13, at 811.
19. See Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431, 442, 161 N.W.2d 631, 638 (1968). The
duties in the second exception now receive a restrictive reading in Wisconsin and the term
"other care" embraces only legal duties and not supervision. Compare Lemmen v. Servais,
39 Wis. 2d 75, 78, 158 N.W.2d 341, 343 (1968) (failure to instruct six-year-old child as to
safety procedures in alighting from school bus within "other care;" considered aspect of
education) with Cole v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 47 Wis. 2d 629, 634-35, 177 N.W.2d 866,
869 (1970) ("other care" limited to legal duties).
20. 277 N.W.2d 515 (Minn. 1979).
21. Id. at 519.
22. Id. at 517.
23. I. at 519 & n.5.
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severely injuring the hand.24 The jury, by special verdict, found defendant Toro eighty-five percent and the father fifteen percent negligent.25
On appeal by both defendants, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed,
dismissing Toro's contentions that the jury returned an excessive verdict
and that the evidence failed to support the determination of negligence.2 6 The court then turned its attention to the father's claim of parental immunity from suit.27

Because the father's conduct in Romanik did not involve parental discretion in the provision of "food, clothing, housing, medical and dental
services, and other care," the second rule allowing parental immunity
was found inapplicable. 28 In its discussion of the first rule, the court determined that the jury's finding that the father was negligent could encompass either a finding of negligent supervision or negligent
instruction. 29 A review of the relevant testimony convinced the court
that the jury's finding of negligence was "more likely based on the father's instructions

. . .

than on the broader finding of negligent supervi-

sion."30 As "an affirmative act of negligence involving a foreseeable,
unreasonable risk of injury to a child," the negligent instruction was held
to fall outside the first area of immunity.31 Therefore, the court dis3
missed the father's claim of parental immunity. 2

In making its decision, the Romanik court examined cases from Michigan and Wisconsin, two jurisdictions that have adopted the fourth abrogation approach. 33 These jurisdictions have taken disparate courses in
their analyses of negligent supervision. Michigan construes the first exception broadly and holds that parents guilty of negligent supervision are
immune from suit. 34 Although Wisconsin does not place negligent super24. Id. at 517.
25. Id. The jury also found Toro Company strictly liable for selling a product in a
defective condition unreasonably dangerous to users. Id.
26. See id. at 517-18.
27. See id. at 518-20.

28. See id.at 518-19. The Romanik court also concurred with Wisconsin's more restrictive interpretation of "other care" as contained in the second exception. See id.; note 19
supi a.

29. See 277 N.W.2d at 519.
30. Id. at 520.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See id. at 519.
34. See, e.g., Hush v. Devilbiss Co., 77 Mich. App. 639, 259 N.W.2d 170 (1977) (extending negligent supervision protection to a grandparent in loco parentis); Paige v. Bing
Constr. Co., 61 Mich. App. 480, 233 N.W.2d 46 (1975) (negligent supervision within first
exception). The Michigan Court of Appeals placed negligent supervision within the first
immunity because the court felt that authority and supervision could not be logically
distinguished on a case-by-case basis. See id. at 485-86, 233 N.W.2d at 49.
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vision within the first exception,3 5 acts of negligent supervision may fall
within the second exception if the act in question represents a legal obligation of the parent to the child, 36 is essentially parental in nature,3 7 and
involves the specific conduct encompassed by the exception.
Because the Romanik court determined that the jury based its verdict
upon a finding of negligent instruction,38 the court's conclusion should
have precluded any need to address negligent supervision. The Roman'k
court, however, evidently felt sufficiently troubled by the negligent supervision question that, after engaging in an analysis of the Michigan
and Wisconsin approaches, it decided to "leave

. .

.construction of the

scope of the parental-authoriyexception to a case where liability is based on
a clear finding of negligent supervision."39 The court's language indicates that Minnesota will probably treat negligent supervision under the
first exception. Such an approach could lead to the eventual adoption
by the Minnesota court of a general rule granting parental immunity
from suits for negligent supervision4O instead of Wisconsin's restrictive
case-by-case determination within the second exception.41
The difficulty in resolving the negligent supervision question centers
around the desire of courts to immunize parents from tort liability when
the injuries to their children arise out of daily occurrences. 42 Most jurisdictions that have abrogated parental immunity recognize the need to
leave some area of parental conduct immune from tort liability due to
the impossibility of guarding against all possible injuries.43 Complete
35. Thoreson v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Co., 56 Wis. 2d 231, 247, 201
N.W.2d 745, 753 (1972); see 277 N.W.2d at 519.
36. See Cole v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 47 Wis. 2d 629, 634-35, 177 N.W.2d 866, 869
(1970).
37. See id. at 633, 177 N.W.2d at 869.
38. 277 N.W.2d at 520.
39. Id. (emphasis added).
40. Cf Bell v. Schwartz, 422 F. Supp. 257, 259 (D. Minn. 1976) (court concluded that
Minnesota would adopt the Michigan approach and find negligent supervision within the
first exception).
41. See, e.g., Thomas v. Kells, 53 Wis. 2d 141, 191 N.W.2d 872 (1971).
App. 2d 199, 206, 241 N.E.2d 12, 15 (1968)
42. See, e.g., Schenk v. Schenk, 100 I11.
(immunity preserved when "the carelessness, inadvertence or negligence is but the product
of the hazards incident to inter-family living and common to every family"); Rodebaugh
v. Grand Trunk W.R.R., 4 Mich. App. 559, 566, 145 N.W.2d 401, 405 (1966) ("A sensible
rule will allow children to recover damages. . . but yet not subject parents to legal action
for commonplace failures in performance of parental duties."); Lastowski v. Norge CoinO-Matic, Inc., 44 A.D.2d 127, 130, 355 N.Y.S.2d 432, 435 (1974) (heavy burden would be
added to parenthood if parents were subject to liability for accidents arising out of daily
experiences); Lemmen v. Servais, 39 Wis. 2d 75, 79-80, 158 N.W.2d 341, 344 (1968) (Goller
rule not meant to impose liability for daily experiences). But see Cole v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 47 Wis. 2d 629, 177 N.W.2d 866 (1970) (court seems to have abandoned the Lemmen
interpretation of the Goller rule; parents held liable for injuries arising out of child's play).
43. See, e.g., Cherry v. Cherry, 295 Minn. 93, 203 N.W.2d 352 (1972). The Cherry
court quoted with approval the language of Lemmen that construed the Goller rule to grant
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abrogation of the immunity could lead to a flood of cases burdening
court calenders as well as increasing the possibility of "cakewalk" or collusive recoveries. 44 Furthermore, judicial reluctance to allow claims for
negligent supervision may stem from the possibility that a cotortfeasor
could use negligent supervision as the basis for a contribution action
against the parent. Thus, although the child may desire to avoid in45
trafamily conflict, the third party complaint may cause such a result.

Minnesota should consider a recent New Jersey approach as a means
of achieving a balance between the child's right to recover, the parent's
need to know what type of conduct is actionable, and the public's desire
to prevent overcrowded court calendars. In Convegy v. Maczka,46 a child
sued his parent and a neighbor for negligent supervision when he jumped
off a chair in the basement and injured himself after he had been left in
the basement without parental supervision.47 The Convegy court first analyzed the specific conduct to see if it fit within the terms of the twoexception approach. 48 Arguably, the court refused to find that the parental conduct fell within the exceptions because the exceptions should
be "strictly limited to parental responsibilities and functions the performance or nonperformance of which is actionable in tort." 49 The court
then analyzed the conduct in relation to the "dangerous instrumentality"
doctrine, which imposes upon the parent liability for injuries to third
persons caused by a child's improperly supervised use of a dangerous instrumentality.50 Apparently, the Convery court was prepared to extend
immunity for injuries arising out of daily occurrences even though by the date of this
decision, the Lemmen interpretation had apparently been abandoned by the Wisconsin
courts. Id. at 95, 203 N.W.2d at 353-54; see note 42 supra.
44. For a discussion of the correlation between abrogation of parent-child immunity
in tort actions and the incidence of "cakewalk" liability, see Casey, The Trend of Interspousal
and Parentallmmuni,-Cakewalk Liability, 45 INS. COUNSEL J. 321, 327-34 (1978).
45. Note, supra note 8, at 677-78. This occurred in Romanik as the plaintiff sued Toro,
and Toro impleaded the father for contribution. At trial the father was changed to a
direct defendant. See 277 N.W.2d at 517 & n. 1. For a discussion of the law of contribution
in Minnesota, see Note, Contribution and Indemnity-An Examination of the Upheaval in Mnnesota Tort Loss Allocation Concepts, 5 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 109 (1979).
46. 163 N.J. Super. 411, 394 A.2d 1250 (Law Div. 1978). The holding in this case
appears to be in direct conflict with Fritz v. Anderson, 148 N.J. Super. 68, 371 A.2d 833
(Law Div. 1977). To date, no New Jersey appellate court has resolved the apparent conflict between these trial court opinions.
47. 163 N.J. Super. at 413, 394 A.2d at 1252.
48. See id. at 415-17, 394 A.2d at 1253. Although New Jersey has not actually
adopted the two exception approach as the ratio decidendi of a case, the intermediate appellate court has approved the exceptions under limited circumstances. See Gross v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 158 N.J. Super. 442, 447, 386 A.2d 442, 445 (App. Div. 1978) (dictum).
49. See 163 N.J. Super. at 415-17, 394 A.2d at 1253. After stating that the exceptions
were to be interpreted narrowly, the court shifted its analysis to possible avenues of recovery. See id. at 415-17, 394 A.2d at 1253-54.
50. The "dangerous instrumentality" doctrine requires that the child had use of or
access to a dangerous instrumentality without adequate supervision or was not controlled
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this doctrine to the minor's own injuries.51 Although the court found
that the injury did not involve a "dangerous instrumentality," the child
was allowed to present a broader cause of action paralleling traditional
negligence principles when the parent's conduct falls outside the narrowly construed exceptions.52 Under this approach, the parent owes a
duty of care to the child identical to that duty owed by any other person
with a special relationship to the child,53 for example, a school principal, 54 a summer camp proprietress, 55 or grandparents. 56 Thus, under the
Convey scheme, parents owe no greater duty to the child than does a
third person, but they cannot expect special protection outside the narrowly interpreted exceptions.
or curbed despite the child's inclination towards dangerous conduct. See id. Minnesota
adopted a similar approach in Republic Vanguard Ins. Co. v. Buehl, 295 Minn. 327, 204
N.W.2d 426 (1973). Citing as authority the New Jersey decision in McDonald v. Home
Ins. Co., 97 N.J. Super. 501, 235 A.2d 480 (App. Div. 1967) (action against parents based
upon their alleged negligence in failing to supervise and control child when they knew of
latter's violent and dangerous habits), the court in Repubhic VanguardIns. Co. stated:
Since the elements of such a cause of action [injury caused by negligent use of
motorcycle] involve a breach of duty by parents to exercise reasonable supervision and control over their minor child so as to prevent him from creating an
unreasonable risk of bodily harm to others, liability is not established unless it is
also proved that the parents know, or have reason to know, of the necessity and
opportunity for exercising such control and are chargeable with knowledge of
the dangerous or violent propensities of the child. In short, liability of the parent
arises from his active parental misconduct in creating an unreasonable risk of
harm to others by placing an instrumentality into the hands of a minor child
who the parents know, or ought to know, is unable to utilize it without endangering innocent third parties.
295 Minn. at 332, 204 N.W.2d at 429.
51. See 163 N.J. Super. at 416, 394 A.2d at 1253. New York recently rejected the
notion that a child may recover from its parent under the "dangerous instrumentality"
doctrine. See Nolechek v. Gesuale, 46 N.Y.2d 332, 385 N.E.2d 1268, 413 N.Y.S.2d 340
(1978). Although the doctrine imposes liability upon parents for injuries their children
inflict upon third persons, the Nolechek court refused to extend the theory for fear that "the
practical consequences of permitting a child to recover on the 'dangerous instrument' theory could be serious and unfortunate." Id. at 338, 385 N.E.2d at 1272, 413 N.Y.S.2d at
344.
52. See 163 N.J. Super. at 416, 394 A.2d at 1253.
53. See id.
54. E.g., Titus v. Lindberg, 49 N.J. 66, 73, 228 A.2d 65, 68 (1967) (school personnel
have duty to exercise reasonable supervisory care on behalf of the children entrusted to
them).
55. E.g., Brown v. Knight, 362 Mass. 350, 285 N.E.2d 790 (1972) (summer school
proprietress who took custody of child for pay had duty to protect child from foreseeable
harm).
56. E.g., Broome v. Horton, 83 Misc. 2d 1002, 1006, 372 N.Y.S.2d 908, 913 (Sup. Ct.
1975) (duty of care is similar to that of a neighbor, teacher, or babysitter). Jurisdictions
that have not completely abrogated the parent-child immunity rule are divided as to
whether grandparents are immune from suit. Compare Busillo v. Hetzel, 58 I11. App. 3d
682, 374 N.E.2d 1090 (1978) (grandparents liable) with Hush v. Devilbiss Co., 77 Mich.
App. 639, 259 N.W.2d 170 (1977) (grandparent not liable for negligent supervision).
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The Convery court echoes New York case law in refusing to find a separate cause of action for negligent supervision,57 but it does recognize a
cause of action within the limits of reasonable foreseeability against persons with a special relationship to the child.58 Under this analysis, a parent will be "liable for failure to exercise reasonable care, precaution and
vigilance" as measured by the child's understanding of the risks of injury
and their foreseeability by the parent. 59 Therefore, under the Conveg
approach, parents will continue to be immunized for most injuries resulting from daily occurrences, yet the child will be protected from situations
involving inherent danger.
Although the Romanik court's decision to delay resolution of the parental supervision issue may lead to less confusion in Minnesota than now
exists in Michigan and Wisconsin, Minnesota presently has no clear rule
to follow. It is hoped that the court will consider the Conveg approach in
arriving at a definitive solution. Meanwhile, Romanik evinces the principle that parental instruction sufficiently negligent to constitute an affirmative act endangering a child is outside both exceptions to the
abrogation of the parent-child immunity doctrine.

Workers' Compensation.-IrrERVENORS' RIGHT TO
REIMBURSEMENT-Brooks v. A.M.F, Inc., 278 N.W.2d 310 (Minn.
1979).
Many Minnesota workers covered by workers' compensation, also
57. See Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 47, 324 N.E.2d 338, 344, 364 N.Y.S.2d
859, 868 (1974).
58. See Convery v. Maczka, 163 N.J. Super. at 416, 394 A.2d at 1253.
59. Id.
1. Under the Minnesota workers' compensation law, MINN. STAT. §§ 176.011-.82
(1978 & Supp. 1979), an injured employee is entitled to compensation from the employer's
compensation carrier for an injury shown to be work related. See id. § 176.021(1) (1978)
("arising out of and in the course of employment").
Nearly all Minnesota workers are covered under the Minnesota workers' compensation law for work-related illness and injury. See id. § 176.041(1) (Supp. 1979) (excluding
employees of railroads engaged in interstate commerce, family farm employees, various
other agricultural workers, and certain other occupations from coverage by workers' compensation). In 1973, 38,953 work-related injuries were reported in Minnesota. By 1978,
this number had increased to 55,536. See MINNESOTA WORKERS' COMPENSATION STUDY
COMMISSION, A REPORT TO THE MINNESOTA LEGISLATURE AND GOVERNOR 205 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as STUDY COMM'N].
Workers' compensation statutes were enacted by state legislatures throughout the nation starting in 1902. See I A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 5.20
(1978). Their purpose was to assure speedy compensation by employers to workers for
work-related injuries. See, e.g., New York C.R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 201 (1917). By
1920, all but eight states had adopted compensation acts. See I A. LARSON, Supra, § 5.30,
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